Directions for improving the tools of state regulation of marketplaces in the interests of small and medium-sized businesses in Russia

Abstract

The rapid digitalization of retail trade in the Russian Federation has led to the fact that e-commerce has transformed from an auxiliary sales channel into a defining turnover infrastructure, demonstrating in 2024 a volume of 11.2 trillion rubles with an increase of 41% and exceeding the share of online sales in the non-food segment by 23.7%, which was accompanied by a high concentration of the market on several dominant marketplaces and the formation of a pronounced negotiating asymmetry in relation to 710,000 small and medium-sized businesses acting as an adhesive party in the offer agreements. Platform holdings in the form of commissions, fines, and service fees reach a median level of 29.4% of the seller's revenue, with a 1.6-fold increase over the previous three years, exacerbating cash shortages due to a 17-day average delay in payments and creating distortions in tax administration, where the simplified tax system is based on the full order amount regardless of the actual funds received, increasing the effective rate to 9.1%. The evolution of conflict interactions reflects a shift from a predominance of quality complaints and refunds to a dominance of disputes over unilateral tariff revisions (47.3%), algorithmic ranking (21.8%), account blocking, and forced participation in promotions, the legal qualification of which is characterized by significant uncertainty due to conflicting arbitration practices, the fragmented nature of the provisions of Federal Law No. 289-FZ "On Platform Economics," and the absence of mandatory restrictions on self-preferencing, algorithm disclosure, or the timing of changes to terms and conditions. A comparison with the European Digital Markets Regulation reveals a systemic gap in the level of protection for sellers, which is manifested in significantly milder sanctions (up to 1% of revenue versus 10-20%), insufficient transparency in ranking mechanisms that reduce conversion by 34-52% when a position is downgraded, and institutional fragmentation of supervisory functions across multiple agencies, resulting in an 8-14 month delay in regulatory response. Food producers are particularly vulnerable, with their margins dropping to a critical 4.1% after platform holdings. A comprehensive institutional and economic analysis allows us to outline the directions for adjusting regulatory tools by introducing restrictions on unilateral changes to the offer, reducing the settlement period to five business days, revising the tax base, establishing special obligations for platforms with gatekeeper characteristics, ensuring top-level disclosure of ranking criteria, consolidating regulatory powers, and implementing compliance mechanisms and pre-trial dispute resolution, taking into account the risks of compensatory tightening of non-price requirements by operators. The presented work makes it possible to establish the essential characteristics of the regulatory lag in the platform economy, to assess its impact on the sustainability of small businesses, and to determine the expediency of referring to the full text in order to develop balanced approaches to balancing the interests of participants in the digital market.